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A crucial feature of rail privatisation in Britain was franchising. Passenger services were 
franchised in competitive bidding processes to train operators which were meant to function 
with declining subsidy. The paper adopts the framework of social cost-benefit analysis to 
examine rail privatisation¶V LPSDFW on three key groups; consumers, producers and the 
government. It establishes that privatisation did not achieve all the supposed benefits. 
Further, franchising only appears to be profitable through the use of calculative accounting 
practices, whereby franchised train operators are portrayed as discrete business entities, 
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µA highly successful model¶ ?  The rail franchising business in Britain 
 
Introduction 
 Rail was the last and most complex step in a long sequence of nationalised industry 
privatisations which had been undertaken by Conservative governments since the early 
1980s. In a radical departure from postwar railway practice the integrated rail industry was 
fragmented, with the vertical separation of train operations from the control and maintenance 
of the infrastructure which became the responsibility of a track authority. The track authority 
was privatised through a share flotation, while train operations were awarded to franchisees 
after a competitive bidding process. Apart from its complexity, another unique feature of rail 
privatisation was that it involved the transfer to private ownership of a loss-making industry 
which required ongoing subsidisation to provide the services expected. Hence, privatisation 
was followed by continuing wealth transfers to private rail companies through increased 
subsidies.  
  According to the 1992 rail privatisation White Paper, awarding train operations to rail 
franchisees following a competitive bidding process was intended to improve the 
performance of previously State-owned British Rail (BR) in several ways. It was expected to 
EULQJ µEHWWHU XVH¶ RI WKH UDLOZD\s than under BR GHOLYHU JUHDWHU µHIILFLHQF\¶ WKDQ WKH
QDWLRQDOLVHGUDLO LQGXVWU\ LQFOXGLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRµUHGXFHFRVWV¶DQGGHOLYHUµEHWWHUYDOXH
IRUPRQH\¶DQG EULQJDµKLJKHUTXDOLW\RIVHUYLFH¶1 The suggested impact on performance of 
the restructuring and privatisation of a nationalised utility could be evaluated by µDVVHVVLQJ
WKH LPSDFW IURP DFWXDO RFFXUUHQFHV¶ RU WR WU\ µto predict or simulate the potential impact 
EDVHG RQ VRPH KLVWRULF WUHQGV¶2 The latter approach characterises studies which use social 




DFFRXQWDZLGHUDQJHRILPSDFWV¶3, both methods are used in this study. It analyses the impact 
RI UDLO¶V UHVWUXFWXULQJ DQGSULYDWLVDWLRQRQ WKH DFWXDOSHUIRUPDQFHRI WKH LQGXVWU\ DQG DOVR
draws on two social cost-benefit analysis studies of rail privatisation. 
  Other studies employing social cost-benefit analysis have addressed the impact of 
complex privatisations such as electricity (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Domah and Pollitt, 
2001) and rail (Pollitt and Smith, 2002; Preston and Robins, 2013), focusing on the efficiency 
and distributional impacts. Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) developed a social cost-
benefit methodology to assess the impact of privatisation on the welfare of groups in society. 
Their methodology estimates the total change in welfare in terms of efficiency gains or losses 
resulting from the privatisation of industries, and the distribution of this welfare change 
between three key groups in society: consumers, producers and the government. The key 
efficiency gains or losses from privatisation are estimated by comparing the difference 
between the present value of costs under private ownership and the counterfactual of the 
present value of estimated costs under continued nationalisation. This approach is broadened 
by the present study which tests the claims for rail privatisation by examining how the 
performance of the privatised industry impacted on consumers, producers and the 
government. The analysis focuses on whether, compared to BR, rail privatisation achieved its 
objectives of: benefiting consumers in terms of lower fares and improved quality of service, 
resulting in increased passenger numbers; benefiting producers by encouraging greater 
efficiency and reducing costs; and benefiting government by improving value for money and 
reducing the need for regulation. Further, the rail franchising model is questioned and shown 
to be profitable only through the use of calculative practices whereby rail franchisees are 
portrayed as discrete commercial entities, rather than as recipients of substantial direct and 
indirect government support. While fLQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ PD\ EH UHJDUGHG DV µVRFLDOO\
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FRQVWUXFWHG DQG PDOOHDEOH¶ LW FDQ VWLOO µEH XVHG WR FRQVWUXFW DOWHUQDWLYH QDUUDWLYHV WKDW «
TXHVWLRQWKHYLDELOLW\RIEXVLQHVVPRGHOV¶4  
  Contrary to the promises of the business model that compelled the fragmentation and 
privatisation of BR, which was justified on the basis of improved µTXDOLW\ RI VHUYLFH¶ DQG
EHWWHU µYDOXHIRUPRQH\¶5, WKHUDLOZD\V¶ WRWDORSHUDWLQJFRVWVKDYHPRUH WKDQGRXEOHGVLQFH
privatisation and the average annual subsidy has more than tripled compared to that received 
by BR.6 Further, after several years of poor performance, the profit-maximising shareholder-
owned infrastructure provider, 5DLOWUDFN FROODSVHG LQWR DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQ  5DLOWUDFN¶V
successor, Network Rail, established as a private, debt-financed company without 
shareholders, has been heavily reliant on both government subsidies and on government-
guaranteed borrowing. A former BR Board member condemned the vertical separation of the 
UDLOZD\V DV µDQ H[WUDRUGLQDU\ PLVWDNH¶,7 while investigations of both the infrastructure 
provider and franchising by bodies which include the Transport Select Committee have been 
severely critical. Supporters of privatisation, however, argue that there have been significant 
improvements in performance in recent years. The body representing train operators, the 
$VVRFLDWLRQRI7UDLQ2SHUDWLQJ&RPSDQLHV$72&DUJXHVWKDW%ULWDLQ¶VXQSUHFHGHQWHGUDLO
SDVVHQJHUJURZWKUHVXOWHGIURPWKHµKLJKO\VXFFHVVIXO¶8 franchising model and, without any 
recognition of the significant financial dependence on government, that the operating 
companies are delivering attractive commercial results. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the importance of the 
calculative practices of accounting in providing the justification for public sector reforms, 
including privatisation, is discussed. Secondly, the importance of franchising is examined, 
particularly its contribution to the development of railways in Britain. This is followed by a 
discussion of the importance of the calculative practices of accounting in providing the 
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justification for public sector reforms, including privatisation. Then the context of rail 
privatisation is established using privatisation files from The National Archives (TNA). The 
subsequent section examines the extent to which privatisation has delivered benefits to 
consumers in terms of lower fares and improved quality of service (which encompasses 
rolling stock investment, better punctuality, less overcrowding and improved safety), all of 
which should encourage passenger growth. 7KLV LV IROORZHG E\ DQ DQDO\VLV RI UDLO¶V FRVW
structure to determine the extent to which the producers have benefited from greater 
efficiency, in terms of reducing costs. The penultimate section evaluates the extent to which 
privatisation has benefited the government by examining the impact on subsidies and on 
developments in regulation, including the second and third rounds of franchising. The final 
section provides conclusions on the rail franchising business. 
Accounting and the use of calculative technologies in public sector reforms 
The belief that accounting simply supplies tools for quantification which can be applied 
objectively has been conclusively deconstructed and contrasted with the view that accounting 
LV D µVRFLDO SKHQRPHQRQ¶ ZKLFK LV µPRUH SRZHUIXO DQG SUREOHPDWLFDO¶ WKDQ RIWHQ
appreciated.9 $FFRXQWLQJFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDSURFHVVRIµDWWULEXWLQJILQDQFLDOYDOXHVDQG
rationales to a wide range of social practices, thereby accordinJWKHPDVSHFLILFYLVLELOLW\¶10 
+HQFH LW LV ORFDWHG µZLWKLQ D EURDG UDQJH RI SUDFWLFHV RI HFRQRPLF FDOFXODWLRQ¶11 Indeed, 
DFFRXQWLQJ µGLVFRXUVHV SOD\ D IXQGDPHQWDO UROH LQ VKDSLQJ VLJQLILFDQW KLVWRULFDO HYHQWV¶12 
Accounting does more than mirror or interpUHWUHDOLW\LWLVLQYROYHGLQWKHµFRPSOH[ZHERI
UHDOLW\FRQVWUXFWLRQ¶13  





thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider 
GHVLUDEOH¶14 The use of technologies, including accounting, to manage both government and 
people, originated with eighteenth century European conceptions of government, whose 
RSHUDWLRQV ZHUH WR EH UHDOLVHG WKURXJK µWKH DFFXPXODWLRQ DQG WDEXODWLRQ RI IDFWV¶15 The 
calculative technologies of accounting practices made it possible for political rationalities to 
be implemented as government programmes, while political rationalities accorded 
µVLJQLILFDQFHV DQG PHDQLQJV WR TXLWH PXQGDQH FDOFXODWLYH URXWLQHV¶16 Calculative practices 
EHFRPH µHQGRZHG ZLWK PHDQLQJ¶ DV WKH\ HPHUJH DQG DUH XVHG17 There is always more 
involved in accounting than simply the calculative practices18. Instead, these practices have a 
strong appeal for governments by apparently offering the prospect of achieving effective 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQE\IROORZLQJFHUWDLQµWHFKQLFDOURXWLQHV¶19 and using the information produced 
to convince others. In Britain in the mid-1960s, for example, economic growth became a key 
JRYHUQPHQWREMHFWLYHDQGVRDFHQWUDO IHDWXUHRI µWKHSROLWLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\¶20 Governments, 
however, could not stimulate growth by controlling individual investment decisions of private 
firms or nationalised industries. Therefore, they encouraged the use of discounted cash flow 
DQDO\VLVLQRUGHUWRLQVWUXPHQWDOL]HWKHJURZWKREMHFWLYHµE\DVSHFLILFFDOFXODWLYHUHJLPH¶21   
 The rise of neo-liberalism in countries such as the USA and Britain brought a 
reorganisation of political rationalities, while the employment of the calculative practices of 
accounting in public sector reforms was intended to create and sustain markets.22 The last few 
GHFDGHVKDYHZLWQHVVHGDGULYHWRSURYLGHDµFDOFXODWLYHNQRZOHGJH¶RIVHUYLFHVUDQJLQJIURP
health to education. To achieve this, accounting has transformed increasing areas of social 
life.23 Although the most visible, and hotly contested, strand of market-focused strategies has 
been privatisation programmes, neo-liberalism has also encompassed a reorganisation of the 
government of personal life as the language of entrepreneurial freedom has become 




enterprises.25 Within public sector enterprises budgetary responsibilities were allocated to 
professionals, such as doctors, who were required to evaluate their actions by translating 
WKHPµLQWRFRVWVDQGEHQHILWV¶WKDWFDQEHJLYHQDQDFFRXQWLQJYDOXH26 Hence, the calculative 
WHFKQRORJLHVRIDFFRXQWLQJDVDµSURIRXQGO\QRUPDOL]LQJDFWLYLW\¶HQFRPSDVVNH\DVSHFWVRI
mRGHUQLW\ LQFOXGLQJ VHWWLQJ µVWDQGDUGV RI HIILFLHQF\¶ DQG µVHHNLQJ WR GHILQH WKH ZD\V LQ
ZKLFKHFRQRPLFVXUSOXVLVWREHFDOFXODWHG¶27 
 7KH  UDLO SULYDWLVDWLRQ :KLWH 3DSHU ZKLFK ZDV LQWURGXFHG E\ -RKQ 0DMRU¶V
Government, was explicitly framed within a neo-liberal framework. The White Paper 
DVVHUWHG WKDW FRPSHWLWLRQ IRU IUDQFKLVHV ZRXOG µEULQJ JUHDWHU UHVSRQVLYHQHVV WR SDVVHQJHU
QHHGVLPSURYHGHIILFLHQF\DQGEHWWHUVHUYLFHV¶28 employing the language of entrepreneurial 
freedom supported by calculative tHFKQRORJLHV7UDLQRSHUDWRUVHQWKXVHGE\µHQWUHSUHQHXULDO
VSLULW¶ZRXOGRSHUDWHDVGLVFUHWHHQWLWLHVEULQJLQJµPRUHORFDOLVHGPDQDJHPHQWFORVHU WRWKH
SXEOLF DQG JUHDWHU RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR « UHGXFH FRVWV¶ DQG VR UDLO¶V VXEVLG\ ZRXOG EH
eliminated in the long run, when franchisees operating profitable routes would make 
payments to government.29 7KH :KLWH 3DSHU¶V UHOLDQFH RQ WKH ODQJXDJH RI HQWUHSUHQHXULDO
IUHHGRP UDWKHU WKDQ HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH ZDV VWULNLQJ JLYHQ WKDW LW DFNQRZOHGJHG %5¶V
µVLJQLILFDQW¶ UHFHQW improvements and high productivity.30 The rail privatisation proposals 
were not only unique in terms of their lack of empirical support, but also in terms of the 
European context. Supporters of the fragmented privatisation model argued, often 
retrospectiveO\ WKDW(XURSHDQGLUHFWLYHUHTXLUHG UDLO¶V LQIUDVWUXFWXUH WREHVHSDUDWHG
from operations. However, the separation did not have to be physical but, as implemented by 
State-RZQHG UDLOZD\V OLNH )UDQFH¶V 61&) DQG *HUPDQ\¶V 'HXWVFKH %DKQ RQO\ DQ
accounting mechanism.31 The citings of the European directive, and the forecasts of 
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efficiency savings, were important examples of the use of the calculative technologies of 
DFFRXQWLQJ WR µVKDSH UHDOLW\¶ DQG VR MXVWLI\ WKH UDLO SULYDWLVDWLRQ SURSRVDOV¶32 In the 
justification of both the concept and the form of rail privatisation, calculative technologies 
were fundamental. 
Franchising and the history of %ULWDLQ¶Vrailways 
  Franchising is a business model where the owner of an asset or service, the franchisor, 
grants another party, the franchisee, the contractual right to market its products or services in 
a defined geographical area for a fixed period of time. Franchisees are required to follow 
rules established by the franchisor and usually pay a fee for the right to operate the franchise. 
Product franchising was developed in the USA in the nineteenth century when manufacturers 
of expensive and complex goods, such as sewing machines, marketed their output through 
specialised retailers acting as agents.33 Business-format franchising, where the outlet itself 
along with a package of support services is the product, emerged in early twentieth-century 
America.34 This form of franchising is now typified by the fast food industry, where outlets 
such as McDonalds have spread globally.  
  While the origins of franchising in the private sector stemmed from product and 
business-format models, its use in the public sector has also had a long history. It was used as 
early as the Middle Ages when franchising referred to services, such as tax collection or road 
construction, which were subcontracted by the State to private individuals for a fee.35 The 
development of road transport in Britain in the seventeenth century was facilitated by the use 
of franchising. Turnpike trusts were organisations which were established by individual Acts 
of Parliament and given powers to collect tolls to provide for the maintenance of major roads. 
From the second half of the eighteenth century there was a significant extension of turnpiking 
and by the 1830s over 1,000 trusts administered around 30,000 miles of turnpike road. Early 
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British railway companies, such as the Stockton and Darlington, acted like the contemporary 
owners of turnpike roads and canals by charging competing train operators for access to the 
track. The development of steam trains soon proved these practices to be both dangerous and 
inefficient. ,QGLYLGXDOLVWLF GULYHUV µRZLQJ DOOHJLDQFH WR D YDULHW\ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ KDG
LQDGHTXDWH µUHJDUG IRU VDIHW\¶ DQG 
FROOLVLRQV ZHUH FRPPRQ¶36 There was also significant 
litigation between rail companies and franchised operators over repair and maintenance 
issues, such as the requirement for train operators to maintain their rolling stock in a safe 
condition, when additional operating expenses meant a reduction in profits.37 Hence, from the 
late 1830s most railway businesses operated as integrated companies, combining track 
RZQHUVKLSZLWK WUDLQRSHUDWLRQV5DLOZD\VZHUH DFNQRZOHGJHG WREH D µQDWXUDOPRQRSRO\¶
DQG WKH µWXUQSLNH¶ RU µRSHQ DFFHVV¶ SULQFLSOH ZDV UHJDUGHG DV µLQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK
VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQRIRSHUDWLQJSUDFWLFHHVVHQWLDOLQDSXEOLFXWLOLW\¶38 
  As rail businesses proliferated, there were conflicting views on the relative merits 
both of competition and cooperation between companies, and on the desirability of state 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ *RYHUQPHQWV YDFLOODWHG µEHWZHHQ ZKHWKHU FRPSHWLWLRQ RU PRQRSRO\ ZDV WKH
PRVWDSSURSULDWHPDUNHWVWUXFWXUH¶IRURUJDQLVLQJUDLOWUDQVSRUW39 *ODGVWRQH¶V5DLOZD\V
Act even gave governments the reserve power to nationalise lines where excess profits were 
made, although this power was never utilised. Hence, debates on the appropriate structure for 
UDLO WUDQVSRUWDQGRQWKHLVVXHRIµSXEOLFRZQHUVKLSYHUVXVSULYDWHHQWHUSULVH¶DUHµDVROGDV
WKHLQGXVWU\LWVHOI¶40 These unresolved debates meant that some regions were poorly served 
E\µH[FHVVLYHFRPSHWLWLRQ¶, which led to a µZDVWHIXO¶ duplication of routes, including µPDLQ 
OLQHV¶EXWDOVRµOLQHVWRDQGIURPPLQLQJDUHDVSRUWVDQGLQGXVWULDOFHQWUHV¶.41 In other areas 
large regional railway companies emerged, and by 1874, fifty years after the opening of the 
Stockton and Darlington railway, the four largest companies owned 39% of the track mileage 
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and the top 10 companies accounted for almost 70% of the mileage.42 Collectively, railway 
companies had recognised very early that some cooperation was needed for survival and so 




 5DLO¶Vmajor restructuring did not occur until the twentieth century, following the First 
World WDU ZKHQ WKH QHWZRUN ZDV µWDNHQ RYHU E\ WKH VWDWH DV DQ HPHUJHQF\ ZDU-time 
PHDVXUHDQGHIIHFWLYHO\UXQDVDQLQWHJUDWHGV\VWHP¶44 Building on the benefits of integration 
achieved in war-time, the 1921 Railways Act reorganised the 120 private rail companies into 
four regional groupings, which struggled financially as they were subject to price controls by 
the Railway Rates Tribunal and faced increasing competition from road transport. The 
subsequent transfer of ownership of industries, such as rail, to public hands after 1945 was 
SDUWO\µWKHORJLFDOH[WHQVLRQRIWKHSUHYLRXVSUDFWLFHRIUHJXODWLRQ¶LQERWK:RUOG:DUV45 The 
nationalisation of the bus, rail and long-distance road haulage industries in 1948 was also 
justified on several grounds, including inadequate investment by private companies and the 
VWURQJHOHPHQWVRIQDWXUDOPRQRSRO\DQGH[WHUQDOLWLHV¶46 associated with these industries. The 
four regional rail companies were merged to form British Railways (which became known as 
British Rail from the mid-1960s). 
 Under public ownership, successive governments expected that BR would combine 
µSXEOLFVHUYLFHDVSLUDWLRQVDQGFRPPHUFLDOYLDELOLW\¶47 This quest was to be thwarted because 
BR was subject to the constraints of government policies and fluctuations in the economy. Its 
financial problems were further exacerbated by successive governments compelling BR to 
finance its capital investment with interest-bearing public debt and by the generous terms 
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granted to the former shareholders of the rail companies which were nationalised, when their 
equity was converted into 30-year loan stock with fixed interest payments which BR was 
obliged to pay. In the 1970s, BR was criticised for losing both money and market share48. 
Hence, after 1979 a series of Conservative Governments demanded greater commercial 
efficiency.49  
 The Conservative Governments elected from 1979 demanded greater efficiency from 
the public sector. Like other nationalised industries, BR was subject to rigorous financial 
discipline, and in response undertook two major internal reorganisations in the 1980s and 
1990s, known respectively as Sector Management and Organising for Quality. Under Sector 
Management, business criteria were injected into a much wider range of decisions affecting 
rolling stock, infrastructure and administration, an approach which improved rail finances in 
the 1980s.50 Calculative technologies of accounting were used to provide cost and revenue 
figures for discrete businesses within BR, such as InterCity and Network SouthEast. BR was 
set a target by government of making InterCity profitable, a target which was achieved partly 
WKURXJKPRUHUHILQHGFRVWDOORFDWLRQUHJDUGHGE\VRPHDV µFUHDWLYHDFFRXQWLQJ¶DQGSDUWO\
through the revenue boost gained from higher fares and passenger growth in the late 1980s.51 
7KHFXOPLQDWLQJFKDQJH LQ%5¶VUHIRUPVZDV Organising for Quality, which eliminated the 
UDLOZD\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO UHJLRQDO VWUXFWXUH DQG GLYLGHG VWDII DPRQJ VHFWRUV FRQVLVWLQJ RI VL[
businesses and 27 profit centres.52 Although these reorganisations were controversial, and 
involved many redundancies, Organising for Quality led to improvements in both 
SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG SXQFWXDOLW\ DQG RIIHUHG WKH SURVSHFW µRI D PRUH VWUHDPOLQHG FRQVXPHU-
RULHQWHG HPSRZHUHG RUJDQLVDWLRQ LQ DQ LQWHJUDWHG IRUP¶53 While these reorganisations 
WRJHWKHUZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDVWURQJEXVLQHVVFXOWXUHZHUHVHHQE\%5¶VPDQDJHPHQWDV
µD KRPH-JURZQ VROXWLRQ WR JRYHUQPHQWDO DWWDFN¶ WKH\ DOVR DUJXDEO\ µFUHDWHG SUHFRQGLWLRQV
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IRU WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI SULYDWLVDWLRQ¶54 7KH µFUafted accounts representing the railway as a 
VHULHV RI EXVLQHVVHV « SHUPHDWHG WKURXJK PDQDJHPHQW VWUXFWXUHV « WR RSHUDWLRQV RQ WKH
JURXQG¶ DQG VR WKH UDLOZD\ µKDV EHFRPH LWV EXVLQHVVHV¶55 Ironically, the successful 
reorganisation of BR was only completed in 1992, the year rail privatisation plans were 
announced.  
The context of rail privatisation 
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU 0DUJDUHW 7KDWFKHU KDG EHHQ UHOXFWDQW WR DWWHPSW %5¶V full privatisation 
because such a move was likely to be unpopular and there was a long history of financial 
losses. However, the Thatcher Government established the Serpell Committee on Railway 
)LQDQFHVWRUHYLHZ%5¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGWRVHFXUHLPSURYHGILQDQFLDOUHVXOWV7KH6HUSHOO
&RPPLWWHH µERWK SUHILJXUHG DQG LQIOXHQFHG IXWXUH HYHQWV¶ when the Conservative 
Government employed consultants to provide critical reports to the Committee, whose 
recommendations influenced rail privatisation in the 1990s.56  
 Chaired by Sir David Serpell, a former Permanent Secretary of the Transport 
Department, the members of the Serpell Committtee included Leslie Bond, a director of the 
Rank organisation, Jim Butler from the accountancy firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell (PMM), 
and Alfred Goldstein from the consulting engineers R. Travers Morgan (TM). Butler and 
Goldstein were both senior partners in their respective firms7KHODWWHU¶V appointment by the 
Thatcher Government ZDVSDUWLFXODUO\ FRQWURYHUVLDODVKHZDV µDQ LQWHOOHFWXDO ULJKW-winger 
« LQ IDYRXU RI FRQYHUWLQJ UDLOZD\V LQWR URDGV¶.57 7KH &RPPLWWHH¶V ZRUN LQYROYHG D
significant conflict of interest, as a large amount of work was outsourced at a cost of 
£627,000 to the consultancy firms which had seconded Butler and Goldstein.58  
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 The importance of the consultants is emphasised in the Serpell Report. The 
introduction to thH5HSRUWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWµZHKDYHEHHQJUHDWO\KHOSHG¶E\WKHWZRILUPV
RIFRQVXOWDQWVZKRZHUHFRPPLVVLRQHGWRµGHYHORSDQGHYDOXDWH¶WKHQHWZRUNRSWLRQVLQ3DUW
,,RIWKH5HSRUWDQGWRVWXG\%5¶V%XGJHWDQG5DLO3ODQ.59 Part I of the Serpell Report, 
ZKLFK H[DPLQHG %5¶V ILQDQFHV GUHZ KHDYLO\ RQ WKH -page PMM analysis of the rail 
industry prepared by Jim Butler, and the network options examined in Part II were based on 
the options study by TM. The Serpell Report argued that BR was very inefficient and had 
high costs, which meant that there was significant scope for reducing expenditure on staff 
wages, track maintenance and lines.60 In order to stimulate change in BR the Serpell 
Committee advocated the introduction of competition and partial privatisation. BR was 
FULWLFLVHGIRUEHLQJWKHRQO\PDMRUUDLOZD\µRWKHUWKDQLQ,QGLD¶WRPDQXIDFWXUHLWVRZQUROOLQJ
stock.61 Hence, the Serpell Report advocated reducing costs by fragmenting and privatising 
%5¶VHQJLQHHULQJVXEVLGLDU\RUE\WHQGHULQJIRUDOOUROOLQJVWRFNµQHZEXLOGFRQWUDFWV¶DQG
FRQWUDFWLQJRXWµPDLQWHQDQFHDQGUHSDLUZRUN¶.62 ,WDOVRSUHVHQWHG70¶VVL[QHWZRUNRSWLRQV
ranging from the maintenance of the existing network of 10,000 route miles (miles of train 
route with at least one track) to a radically reduced and unsubsidised network of 1,630 route 
miles.63 Whichever option was selected, the Serpell Committee argued that substantial 
VDYLQJVFRXOGEHPDGHE\UHGXFLQJWUDFNPDLQWHQDQFHZRUNWRWKHµORZHVW OHYHO¶FRQVLVWHQW
ZLWKµPDLQWDLQLQJVDIHW\¶.64 
 Faced with the SerpelO5HSRUW¶VDUJXPHQWV IRUFRVW UHGXFWLRQVDQG OLQHFORVXUHV WKH
%5%RDUGDUUDQJHGOHDNVEHIRUHWKHIXOOUHSRUWZDVSXEOLVKHGZKLFKµIRFXVHGPHGLD attention 
RQWKHPRUHGUDFRQLDQSUHVFULSWLRQVRIIHUHGIRUWKHQHWZRUN¶65 BR gained allies in the press, 
and both Houses of Parliament, in opposing the Serpell Report.66 An internal ministerial 
group (MISC 94) was established in March 1983 to consider the Report but, with a general 
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election pending, the political fall-RXWRIµDVKDUSFXWLQWKHUDLOZD\VZDVMXGJHGWRRULVN\¶.67 
The Treasury submitted a paper to MISC 94 examining the prospects for privatising BR, 
which cautiously concluded WKDW %5 ZDV QRW D FDQGLGDWH IRU µWRWDO SULYDWLVDWLRQ¶ ZKHUH D
QDWLRQDOLVHGLQGXVWU\LVµEURNHQXSLQWRVPDOOHUXQLWV¶ZKLFKKDYHWRFRPSHWHLQWKHPDUNHW
SODFH µIUHH IURP JRYHUQPHQW FRQWURO¶68 Several reasons were advanced for this, including 
WKDW%5FDQµQHYHUEHHQWLUHO\IUHH¶ from government financial support as historically it has 
µIXOILOOHG VRFLDO REMHFWLYHV¶ ZKLFK DUH OLNHO\ WR EH UHWDLQHG IRU µSROLWLFDO UHDVRQV¶ 69 These 
µVRFLDOREMHFWLYHV¶, LWZDVDUJXHGµMXVWLI\DVXEVLG\DQGDVORQJDVWKH\DUHUHWDLQHGDUDLOZD\
run exclusively by commercial criteria is not feasible.70 Social objectives for rail had been 
explicitly accepted in the 1968 Transport Act, which advocated the use of government 
subsidy to support loss-making passenger services. )XUWKHUWKHUDLOZD\VZHUHUHJDUGHGDVµD
large and complex system with many joint costs and the inter-dependence of different 
VHUYLFHV¶71 The Treasury paper did support the experimental introduction of competitive 
franchising for some passenger rail services,72 at the same time making it clear that problems 
could arise even with a limited franchising programme. There were risks that the bidding 
process might result in some competitors submitting µORZELGVWRZLQDIUDQFKLVH¶DQGWKHQ
WKH IUDQFKLVLQJ DXWKRULW\ VXEVHTXHQWO\ FRXOG KDYH µJUHDW GLIILFXOW\¶ in maintaining a 
µVDWLVIDFWRU\¶ VHUYLFH.73 Moreover, there was the risk of D µFRV\¶ UHODWLRQVKLS GHYHORSing 
between franchisees and the franchising authority.74 
  The cautious Treasury view of the limited prospects for privatising BR, allied to 
0DUJDUHW 7KDWFKHU¶V SUDJPDWLF LQVWLQFWV SUHYDLOHG XQWLO WKH ODWH V However, although 
%5KDGVXFFHVVIXOO\UHVLVWHGWKH6HUSHOO5HSRUW¶VµPRVWH[WUHPHRSWLRQVIRUOLQHFORVXUHV¶,75 
its subsidy and borrowing requirements were strictly controlled and it was encouraged to 
IRFXV RQ µFRUH¶ DFWLYLWLHV DQG VR VHOO VRPH VXEVLGLDU\ EXVLQesses, LQFOXGLQJ µKRWHOV VKLSV
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VXUSOXV SURSHUW\ DQG PHFKDQLFDO HQJLQHHULQJ ZRUNV¶ to raise funds for infrastructure 
investment.76 These activities conditioned managers in BR to the process of privatising 
VXEVLGLDULHV DQG µSODFHG WKHPRQ WKH VOLSSHU\ VORSH WR IXOO SULYDWLVDWLRQ¶.77  Further, by the 
late 1980s major public utilities such as gas had been privatised using share flotations and the 
7UHDVXU\¶V LQIOXHQWLDO SULYDWLVDWLRQ XQLW ZDV NHHQ WR HQFRXUDJH IXUWKHU SULYDWLVDWLRQ WR
stimulate competition and reduce the scope of government. Significant publications such as 
The Right Lines emerged from the free market think tank the Adam Smith Institute which 
supported %5¶V IUDJPHQWDWLRQ into a privatised infrastructure authority and private train 
operators which paid for track access.78  
  0DUJDUHW 7KDWFKHU¶V VXFFHVVRU DV 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU -RKQ 0DMRU XVHG UDLO WR
demonstrate his Thatcherite credentials, proposing a fragmentation model, involving the 
separation of infrastructure and train operations, in the ConservDWLYHV¶ 1992 rail privatisation 
White Paper. The fragmentation model drew on the privatisation of the electricity industry in 
1990, where an integrated nationalised industry had been split up in order to introduce 
competition through the creation of many companies.79 7KH MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU UDLO¶V
privatisation was presented in strongly entrepreneurial language, invoking the power of the 
SULYDWHVHFWRU¶VµPDQDJHPHQWVNLOOV¶DQGµflair¶WRWUDQVIRUPthe industry.80 Hence, language 
was important in rendering the reality of a vertically integrated industry µDPHQDEOH¶ WR
fragmentation and privatisation.81 The entrepreneurial language was combined with public 
policy arguments for franchising, which originated with the nineteenth century social 
reformer Sir Edwin ChadwLFN ZKR DUJXHG WKDW ZKHUH µFRPSHWLWLRQ within WKH ILHOG¶ ZDV
LPSRVVLEOHDXFWLRQLQJ WKHULJKW WRPDQDJHDPRQRSRO\ IUDQFKLVHZRXOGDOORZµFRPSHWLWLRQ
for WKH ILHOG¶82 Franchises would be awarded after a competitive bidding process, with the 
successful bidder being the one offering the best terms. This approach was developed a 
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century later by Demsetz who argued that companies should bid for the right to operate 
SXEOLFVHUYLFHVEHFDXVHµWKHULYDOU\RIWKHRSHQPDUNHW¶SURYLGHVDPRUHHIIHFWLYHGLVFLSOLQH
than regulation.83   
  %5¶V %RDUG DQG WKH PDMRULW\ RI its senior managers opposed the proposed 
fragmentation model for the rail industry, arguing instead IRU µD SULYDWH EXW YHUWLFDOO\
integrated, LQGXVWU\¶84 %5¶VDSSURDFK ZDV UHJDUGHGDVREVWUXFWLYH and so it was excluded 
from the policy-PDNLQJ DUHQD¶85 Instead, the Conservatives turned for support to private 
sector consultants, often from the Big 5 accounting firms, spending £450 million on 
consultancy fees preparing for rail privatisation.86 Chris Green, a senior manager in the 
industry, DUJXHGWKDWUDLOSULYDWLVDWLRQZDVXQLTXHDVµWKHQDWXUHRIWKHQHZVWUXFWXUHZDVQRW
decided by experts working within the industry but by people from outside such as 
FRQVXOWDQWV SROLWLFLDQV DQG FLYLO VHUYDQWV¶.87 The TreasuU\¶V SULYDWLVDWLRQ XQLW GUHZ RQ
FRQVXOWDQF\UHSRUWVWRVXSSRUWUDLO¶VIUDJPHQWDWLRQDQGSULYDWLVDWLRQAn analysis of structural 
options by accountants Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (DHS) focused on the benefits of separating 
the infrastructure from operations 7KH UHSRUW GLVWLQJXLVKHG EHWZHHQ µVXEVLGLVHG¶ DQG
µFRPPHUFLDO¶ WUDLQ VHUYLFHV, arguing that franchising train operations would encourage 
µFRPSHWLWLYHSUHVVXUHV¶ LQ IUDQFKLVHELGGLQJ OHDGLQJ WRHIILFLHQF\JDLQV LQ WKHIRUPRIFRVW
and subsidy reductions.88 DHS advocated introducing competition in the privatised rail 
industry, DVµFRPSHWLWLRQPD[LPLVHVWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDYDLODEOHWRVKDUHKROGHUVRQIHDVLEOHFRVW
UHGXFWLRQ¶, thus encouraging WKH JUHDWHVW µHIILFLHQF\ LPSURYHPHQWV¶, especially where 
µLQHIILFLHQW¶ WUDLQ RSHUDWRUV ZHUH DOORZHG WR JR RXW RI EXVLQHVV89 These optimistic views 
about the benefits of franchising were tempered by WKHUHSRUW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHTXDOLW\RI
SDVVHQJHU VHUYLFHV ZRXOG EH LPSURYHG E\ PDNLQJ TXDOLW\ µD FRQGLWLRQ RI VXEVLG\¶ on 
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subsidised routes,90 thereby explicitly recognising that a subsidy would still be needed in 
future on some routes. 
 The arguments supporting the fragmented rail industry model were reinforced and 
supplemented by analyses in other consultancy reports, such as that of engineering 
consultants Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett (PHB). 3+%¶VDQDO\VLVZDVFRQVRQDQWZLWKWKDWRIWKH
DHS report, arguing that fragmentation of the rail network was necessary in order to 
encourage efficiency through µFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKHSURYLVLRQRI WUDLQVHUYLFHV¶91 It argued that 
regulation would ensure that the privatised track authority used the access charges paid by the 
IUDQFKLVHG WUDLQ RSHUDWRUV WR LQYHVW LQ RUGHU WR PDLQWDLQ DQG HQKDQFH µWKH FDSDFLW\ RI WKH
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶.92 This was despite WKHIDFW WKDW WKHUHSRUWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW WKHUHZHUHµQR
%ULWLVKRURYHUVHDVH[DPSOHV¶RIVXFKDWUDFNDXWKRULW\93  
  3DUNHU¶V research using unpublished Cabinet papers and Treasury documents has 
emphasised that in rail privatisationµPRUHWKDQDQ\RWKHU, the Treasury drove the form that it 
took¶94 7KHIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIWKHUDLOLQGXVWU\UHVXOWHGIURPWKHEHOLHIRIµVRPHPLQLVWHUVDQG
WKH 7UHDVXU\ WKDW WKH UDLOZD\V VKRXOG EH D FRPSHWLWLYH LQGXVWU\¶ WKXV WKH µLGHRORJ\ RI WKH
PDUNHW¶ dominated rail privatisation.95 While the Treasury hoped that efficiencies from 
RSHUDWLQJLQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUZRXOGOHDGWRORZHUFRVWVDQGVXEVLGLHVIRUUDLOµthere was no 
serious study of the scope for such efficiency gains within Whitehall¶ 96 (emphasis added).  
  While the Treasury drew on the optimistic views of the general benefits of 
competition provided in consultancy reports, both BR and the Department of Transport raised 
specific issues in opposition to the fragmented privatisation model proposed by consultants. 
In 1991, a transport expert, Professor Bradshaw, was hired by BR to analyse the PHB 
proposals. His prescient critique highlighted the risk that the track access charges paid by 




He also raised significant misgivings DERXWKRZµFDSLWDOPDUNHWGLVFLSOLQHV¶ could work with 
the monopolist track authority.98 %5¶V&KDLUPDQ6LU%RE5eid, attempted to raise concerns 
directly with Ministers. A letter sent to the (then) Transport Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, in 
$SULOHPSKDVLVHGWKHµFRPSOH[LW\¶RIWKHSULYDWLVDWLRQSURSRVDOVZLWKWKHQHHGIRUDW
least 15,000 contracts because of the multiplicity of interrelationships between individual 
parts of the railways DQGWKHµVWUDQJHORRNLQJ¶QDWXUHRIWKHIUDJPHQWHGPRGHOZKLFKZRXOG
µEHGHSHQGHQWRQFRQWLQXHGVXEVLG\¶.99 Concerns about franchise bidding and the financing 
of the track authority were also expressed in 1991 in a Department of Transport paper. The 
analysis perceptively highlighted both the risk that the bids of potential franchisees might be 
µXQUHDOLVWLFDOO\ORZ¶DQG the risk WKDWWKHµKLJKFRVWRIPDMRULQIUDVWUXFWXUHUHQHZDOVPeans 
WKDWDFDSLWDOJUDQWVFKHPH¶PLJKWEHQHHGHG. 100 
 These cogent arguments had no impact on the privatisation plans, as demonstrated by 
DEULHILQJQRWHSUHSDUHGIRU WKH%5&KDLUPDQ¶VPHHWLQJZLWK WKHQHZ7UDQVSRUW6HFUHWDU\
John MacGregor, about the 1992 privatisation White Paper. The briefing note raised points of 
µPDMRUFRQFHUQ¶ZLWKWKHSULYDWLVDWLRQPRGHOSUHGLFWLQJWKDWWKHWUDFNDFFHVVFKDUJHVSDLGE\
IUDQFKLVHGRSHUDWLQJFRPSDQLHVZRXOGKDYHDµGUDPDWLFHIIHFW¶OHDGLQJWRLQFUHDVHVLQERWK
costs and subsidy, and that there could be difficulty in maintaining safety standards as, unlike 
the existing arrangements, there would not be one Safety Authority to monitor operations.101 
  Despite significant opposition, which included BR, lobby groups, the Labour Party, 
and several Conservative MPs, tKH 0DMRU *RYHUQPHQW¶V UDLO SULYDWLVDWLRQ SURSRVDOV ZHUH
implemented by the 1993 Railways Act which introduced a radical separation of 
infrastructure from train operations. Railtrack, the infrastructure authority, was privatised by 
public flotation in 1996 and subject to regulation by the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) 
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(later renamed the Office of Rail Regulation, currently named the Office of Rail and Road). 
By 1997 the rail industry had been fragmented into over 100 companies. These included 25 
train operating companies (TOCs), which held fixed-term franchises awarded by the Office 
of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), later subsumed into the Strategic Rail Authority 
(SRA), which also regulated their performance and provided subsidies. The TOCs paid track 
access charges to Railtrack, which was intended to operate without subsidy. The origin of the 
IUDQFKLVHV ZDV %5¶V SURILW FHQWUHV LQWURGXFHG DV SDUW RI LWV 2UJDQLVLQJ IRU 4XDOLW\
programme, demonstrating the imSRUWDQFH RI %5¶V XVH RI FDOFXODWLYH WHFKQRORJLHV LQ
prefiguring privatisation. All network maintenance and renewal work was outsourced to 13 
infrastructure companies which made extensive use of subcontracting. Three unregulated 
rolling stock companies (ROSCOs) supplied the TOCs with leased vehicles. 
  After the rail privatisation legislation was passed, the case for introducing franchising 
for passenger rail services was examined further in an academic report prepared for the 
Treasury. This highlighted the DUJXPHQW WKDW µIUDQFKLVLQJKDV WKH FDSDFLW\ WR UHGXFHFRVWV¶
compared with public provision.102  The report examined the circumstances which were most 
favourable to franchising. These included: establishing a competitive bidding process for 
franchises; the fUDQFKLVHHV EHDULQJ VRPH RI WKH µFRVW DQG UHYHQXH ULVNV¶ WKH IUDQFKLVRU
monitoring the µTXDOLW\RISHUIRUPDQFH¶ of franchisees; and franchises operating for a finite 
period and being subject to renewal.103 The report also presciently identified problems which 
could arise from franchising, including post-FRQWUDFWXDO µRSSRUWXQLVWLF EHKDYLRXU¶ E\
successful franchisees and the difficulty of enforcing IUDQFKLVHHV¶ µLQYHVWPHQWSURPLVHV¶104  
  The main argument for privatisation was focussed on the customer, the passenger, 
with improved services and better value for money from fares. Accordingly, adopting a broad 
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social cost-benefit approach, the following section examines the impact of rail privatisation, 
particularly franchising, for customers. 
Impact of privatisation for customers 
Improved use of the railways  
Rail privatisation was intended to produce welfare gains for consumers, and franchising has 
been praised for the way WKDW LW KDV OHG WR µUHFRUG QXPEHUV RI SDVVHQJHUV UHYHUVLQJ D
GRZQZDUGWUHQG¶, thus achieving better use of the railways.105 Between 1997/98 and 2011/12, 
passenger journeys increased by 73% to 1,460 million, and passenger revenue increased by 
£3 billion to over £7 billion.106 This growth, it is argued, partly resulted from franchising 
competitions delivering improved marketing and passenger services. Supporters of 
privatisation also argue that franchising has delivered more investment in the infrastructure 
by TOCs. In practice, however, the vast bulk of the investment in stations, track and 
signalling has been delivered by Network Rail. Between 2008/09 and 2012/13, for example, 
investment by train operators in stations averaged £29 million per year compared to annual 
infrastructure investment by Network Rail averaging £3.7 billion.107  
   Franchising has produced some innovations and product development for passengers. 
These include the shift towards automated ticket vending machines at stations, the 
development of websites to improve ticket sales, and recent moves to allow tickets to be 
booked by mobile phones. The provision of WiFi facilities is also being extended, 
particularly on long-distance routes. Further, the establishment of National Rail Enquiries by 
the train companies has improved travel information for rail passengers. Although such 
changes have made a contribution to passenger growth, they were built on customer-focused 
reforms introduced by BR which KDGEHJXQWRµUHYROXWLRQLVHPDUNHWLQJDQGVKRZHGJUHDWHU
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DWWHQWLRQ WR FXVWRPHU FDUH¶.108 %5¶V LQQRYDWLRQs in the 1980s included the extension of 
railcards to families and young people, and the provision of advance purchase tickets.  
   Rail passenger growth is driven by many factors, apart from innovations, including 
social and economic changes. The fundamental economic change, which strongly influenced 
passenger growth, was %ULWDLQ¶V unprecedented period of economic growth which was 
experienced from the mid-1990s until the 2007/08 financial crisis. Thus, much of the 
SDVVHQJHUJURZWKZRXOGSUREDEO\KDYHRFFXUUHG LUUHVSHFWLYHRI UDLO¶V ownership. Nash and 
Smith 109 argued that, while 20% of the passenger growth for London and the South East may 
result from µimproved marketing or other unmeasured factors following privatisation up to 
¶ PRVW of the JURZWK UHVXOWHG IURP µH[WHUQDO IDFWRUV SDUWLFXODUOy « WKH HFRQRP\¶
Much of the increased passenger growth, argued Preston110 µLV OLNHO\ WR EH GXH WR ULVLQJ
LQFRPHV¶Hence, the TOCs may be regarded as µZLQGIDOOEHQHILFLDULHVRIDQXQSUHFHGHQWHG
SHULRGRIVXVWDLQHGHFRQRPLFJURZWK¶.111 Moreover, rail passenger growth did not start with 
privatisation. BR experienced significant passenger growth as the economy recovered from 
the recession of the early 1980s, with passenger miles increasing by 26% between 1982 and 
1988/89.112 Ironically, it was the failure of the centrepiece of the Major administration¶V
economic policy which produced sustained growth after the government was forced to 
remove sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in October 1992. This policy 
reversal allowed sterling to depreciate and interest rates to be lowered, thus stimulating 
economic growth. 
  Other exogenous factors were also pertinent in encouraging passenger growth. The 
regulatory framework facilitated growth, as price capping was adopted for the first seven 
years of franchising. The price of 46% of rail tickets, including season tickets and savers, was 
capped at the rate of inflation represented by the Retail Price Index (RPI) for three years, and 
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then at 1% below the RPI for the next four years. The importance of fare regulation in these 
early years was demonstrated by the social cost-benefit analyses of the impact of rail 
privatisation. The results are summarised in Table 1. 
    TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
 Pollitt and Smith estimated that the key welfare gain in the early years of privatisation was 
£1.2 billion for consumers, which largely arose from fare regulation, and represented a 
transfer of the welfare surplus from producers to consumers.113 This may be seen as 
inefficient, however, as the overall welfare gain of £1.1 billion achieved up to the year 2000 
resulted from µDGRSWLQJEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFHVWKDWFRXOGQRWEHFRQWLQXHGLQWKHORQJUXQ¶.114 The 
72&V LQLWLDOO\ DWWHPSWHG WR SURFXUH µHIILFLHQF\¶ VDYLQJV LQ WKH IRUP RI UHGXQGDQFLHV
SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH µRYHU]HDORXV SUXQLQJ RI GULYHUV¶, but this led to delays, cancellations and 
passenger complaints.115 5DLOWUDFN¶V attempt to save on infrastructure expenditure, 
particularly maintenance work, led ultimately to the Hatfield crash, which is examined in the 
following section. 
  Other relevant changes which encouraged people to travel by train included increased 
road congestion and major increases in the cost of motoring. The price of the motoring 
expenses included in the RPI, petrol and oil, vehicle maintenance, and tax and insurance, 
µKDYH increased at a faster rate than rail fares¶since privatisation.116 Rail passenger growth 
has also been stimulated by societal changes, including the increase in commuting to work 
and the development of wider social networks.117  Thus, there is considerable evidence that 
increases in passenger numbers cannot be primarily credited to privatisation. The TOCs and 
successive governments, however, by emphasising WKH WUDLQRSHUDWRUV¶ position as µdiscrete 
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entities¶ DQG RYHUORRNLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V VXEVLGy and borrowing, have 
shaped a µQDUUDWLYH¶ which both GHIHQGVµVHFWRUDOLQWHUHVWV¶ DQGYDOLGDWHVµSROLWLFDOUKHWRULF¶
supporting privatisation.118 
Quality of service 
The implications of rail franchising for the quality of passenger service using a broad 
approach to social cost-benefit analysis may be evaluated by examining performance in three 
interrelated areas: rolling stock investment; punctuality and overcrowding; and safety. Rail 
privatisation was intended to encourage private sector investment, but the early results were 
unpromising for rolling stock investment. In its latter days, BR was forbidden from investing 
in new rolling stock and no new orders were placed in nearly three years before privatisation. 
)XUWKHU WKH 72&V DUH µFXULRXV HQWLWLHV¶ HVWDEOLVKHG µZLWKRXW VXEVWDQWLDO DVVHWV LQ RUGHU WR
IDFLOLWDWHHDVHRIHQWU\¶119 They lease trains and rent stations, and so have little incentive to 
directly invest in rail. Instead, the first group of TOCs, whose franchises were mostly about 
seven years in lengtKKDGDVWURQJLQFHQWLYHWRVZHDWWKHLUDVVHWVE\OHDVLQJµFKHDSOLPLWHG-
OLIHHTXLSPHQW¶ IURP526&2V120 7KHXQUHJXODWHG526&2VPDGHµH[WUDYDJDQW¶ UHWXUQVRQ
capital employed of up to 26% per year on existing rolling stock in the four years from 
1996121, and so new investment was slow to materialise.   
 Gradually, investment by the ROSCOs in new trains increased, and over the period 
2001/02 to 2005/06 totalled £4.6 billion compared to £1.1 billion over the previous five 
years.122  Passengers benefited from the new rolling stock, with the average age falling from 
19.86 years in the final quarter of 2001/02 to 13.2 years in the final quarter of 2005/06.123 
More recently, however, rolling stock investment has fluctuated. Investment by ROSCOs in 
the five years from 2006/07 only totalled £1.7 billion, falling from £326 million in 2006/07 to 
£274 million in 2010/11.124 The falling level of investment was reflected in the increase in the 
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average age of rolling stock to 20.18 years in the final quarter of 2014/15.125  This figure was 
KLJKHUWKDQWKHDYHUDJHDJHRI%5¶VUROOLQJVWRFN\HDUV LQ126 Recently, however, 
rolling stock orders and investment have increased, and in 2014/15 rolling stock investment 
reached a record level of £715 million.127 As well as fluctuating levels of investment, there 
have been problems with both the late delivery and poor reliability of some new trains.128 The 
2004 rail White Paper identified serious problems with rolling stock provision, arguing that 
µPDUNHWV LQ UROOLQJVWRFN ILQDQFLQJDQGPDLQWHQDQFH¶ DUHQRWZRUNLQJDV H[SHFWHG129 In an 
attempt to remedy these market deficiencies, the Department for Transport in 2009 bypassed 
the ROSCOs and identified Agility Trains Ltd, a consortium of Hitachi Rail (Europe) and 
John Laing plc, as the preferred bidder to provide new trains for the InterCity Express 
Programme.130 This project, finalised by the Coalition Government in 2013, is the most 
significant rolling stock investment programme since privatisation, costing around £7.65 
billion to provide 866 new train carriages by 2019.131 The procurement process was criticised 
E\ WKH 3XEOLF $FFRXQWV &RPPLWWHH KRZHYHU IRU EHLQJ µSRRUO\ PDQDJHG¶ ZLWK µZHDN¶
oversight of costs, problems highlighted when Agility offered a revised bid with a 38% price 
reduction after the project was suspended so that its value for money could be re-evaluated.132 
Even with this price reduction, informed rail sources argue that the Hitachi trains will cost 
around 60% more to lease than the more suitable Pendolino trains leased by Virgin on the 
East Coast  line.133 
   The lack of new investment in rolling stock was one of the reasons for the 
SHUIRUPDQFH SUREOHPV H[SHULHQFHG E\ 72&V IROORZLQJ SULYDWLVDWLRQ %5¶V RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
reforms in the decade before privatisation had enabled it to cope with rising passenger 
demand while improving punctuality. The performance of InterCity trains improved steadily, 
with the proportion arriving on time increasing from 77% in 1986/87 to 91% by 1993/94 and 
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the proportion of all trains arriving on time averaging  90%  by 1993/94. 134  Under 
privatisation, as Table 2 reveals, overall punctuality declined from 89.8% in 1997/98 to 
87.8% in 1999/2000. 
    TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
This was followed by a striking fall in punctuality to 78% by 2001/02, which arose primarily 
IURP WKH +DWILHOG FUDVK LQ 2FWREHU  DQG LWV DIWHUPDWK 5DLOWUDFN¶V SRRU FRQWUDFW
management, combined with the outsourcing of maintenance and renewal work, led directly 
to the crash.135 ,W ZDV IROORZHG E\ DQ HPHUJHQF\ SURJUDPPH RI µGUDFRQLDQ VSHHG OLPLWV¶
DURXQG WKH FRXQWU\ EHFDXVH 5DLOWUDFN ZKLFK ODFNHG DQ DVVHW UHJLVWHU µIRXQG LW GLIILFXOW WR
HVWDEOLVK ZKHWKHU WKHUH ZHUH PRUH EURNHQ UDLOV¶136 5DLOWUDFN¶V UHSODFHPHQW 1HWZRUN 5DLO
LQKHULWHG µWKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH IUDJPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH UDLOZD\V UHVXOWLng from 
SULYDWLVDWLRQ¶137 It has taken extensive infrastructure work, underpinned by billions of 
pounds in capital grants, to gradually return punctuality to the pre-privatisation level and then 
to reach performance levels of around 90% from 2008/09. There are still significant 
variations in performance between operators, however, with long distance operators lagging 
behind the others. 
  The substantial increase in infrastructure investment following the Hatfield crash 
µFRXOGEHVHHQDVWKHPDUNHWFRUUHFWLQJ¶\HDUVRIXQGHULQYHVWPHQWE\%5, when its subsidy 
and  borrowing were both strictly limited by governments.138 2QWKHRWKHUKDQG5DLOWUDFN¶V
neglect of network maintenance arguably resulted from UDLO¶V fragmentation and privatisation, 
with the separation of the profit-maximising infrastructure provider from the franchised 
TOCs, compounded by the failure of the regulatory regime to ensure adequate infrastructure 




  Apart from punctuality, which is related to infrastructure investment, another key 
performance indicator for the TOCs is overcrowding. TOCs may be penalised for operating 
services above the passengers in excess of capacity limit which, for London and South East 
commuter services, is 4.5% above capacity for the morning or evening peak alone or 3% 
across both peaks.141 In 2000/01, the SRA reported that five franchises breached the 3% 
target, the worst performer having 6.6% of passengers in excess of capacity.142 Overcrowding 
problems continued over the following decade. In Autumn 2010, three franchises breached 
the 3% target, the worst performer having 16.6% of passengers in excess of capacity.143 
Further, an analysis of peak arrivals and departures at London stations in Autumn 2010 
revealed that 20.9% of peak arrival services had passengers in excess of capacity, the worst 
performer carrying 59.1% of passengers in excess of capacity into Paddington station.144  
  The complex and expensive regulatory system established at privatisation has had 
little impact on the quality of rail services, and there have been significant problems with the 
PRQLWRULQJRIWKH72&V¶SHUIRUPDQFH7KHVHLQFOXGHXQGHPDQGLQJSHUIRUPDQFHEHQFKPDUNV
and an ineffective system of incentives and penalties. Concerns over performance were 
highlighted by the Transport Committee, which called for higher performance targets and 
µH[FHSWLRQDOO\DFFXUDWHDQGULJRURXV¶PRQLWRULQJRIWKH72&V145 The fundamental problem 
with attempting to improve the quality of service through regulation is that regulatory 
PHFKDQLVPV DUH GLIILFXOW WR DSSO\ WR IUDQFKLVHV ZKHUH µRSHUDWLQJ ORVVHV¶ DUH D
characteristic146 and rail must be maintained as a public service. 
  A particularly critical, high profile aspect of quality of service is that of safety. BR 
ZDV VWDIIHG E\ DQ LQWHJUDWHG ZRUNIRUFH ZKLFK GHYHORSHG D FXOWXUH ZKHUH µVDIHW\ ZDV
QXUWXUHG DV D KDELW RI WKRXJKW¶147 There were fewer deaths in railway accidents in each 
successive postwar decade: from 344 deaths in the 1940s, to 337 in the 1950s, with major 
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reductions to 75 in the 1980s.148 Although there was a falling number of deaths in accidents 
across the decades, serious accidents, notably Clapham in 1988, still did occur. The Clapham 
accident, caused by faulty wiring affecting a signal, where 35 people died provided µDFDWDO\VW
IRUFKDQJH¶DV WKHILQGLQJVRI WKHSXEOLF LQTXLU\SURYLGHGµDFRPSUHKHQVLYHDJHQGDIRU WKH
LPSURYHPHQW RI UDLOZD\ VDIHW\¶.149 This improvement was reflected in the fact that in the 
1990s there were just eight deaths in accidents up to privatisation in 1996/97. This enhanced 
VDIHW\ FXOWXUH RI %5 ZDV IUDFWXUHG DQG ZHDNHQHG E\ SULYDWLVDWLRQ 7KHUH ZDV µD GLUHFW
relationship between post-SULYDWLVDWLRQ RUJDQLVDWLRQDO FKDQJHV¶ DQG IRXU IDWDO DFFLGHQWV
whicKDOORULJLQDWHGLQWKHLQGXVWU\¶VIUDJPHQWDWLRQµDQGWKHQHJOHFWRIVDIHW\FRQVLGHUDWLRQV
EHWZHHQRUJDQLVDWLRQDOERXQGDULHV¶150 Accident inquiries allocated most of the responsibility 
to Railtrack, but in the first two accidents the TOCs shared some responsibility. In the 1997 
accident at Southall there was a lack of co-ordination between Railtrack and Great Western 
7UDLQVRYHUWKHUHSRUWLQJRIIDXOWVLQWKHWUDLQ¶VHDUO\ZDUQLQJV\VWHPDQGWKHPRUHVHULRXV
accident at Ladbroke Grove in 1999 exposed the weakness of the driver training programme 
of Thames Trains.151  
 Following these accidents, far more attention was paid to safety in the rail industry. 
Network Rail increased infrastructure expenditure significantly above that of Railtrack.152 In 
particular, it introduced the Train Protection and Warning System at a cost of £585 million. 
7KLV V\VWHP JUHDWO\ UHGXFHG µRQH WKH PDLQ FDXVHV RI SUHYHQWDEOH DFFLGHQWV WUDLQV JRLQJ
WKURXJKUHGOLJKWV¶153 , and in the eight years following 2006/07 no passengers died as a result 
of a train accident.154 There is now far more recognition that safety is a key aspect of 
measuring performance than when Railtrack followed its profit-maximising agenda. Network 




  Another major argument for privatisation was focussed on the producers, who would 
be encouraged to improve efficiency. Hence, within the SDSHU¶VFRPSUHKHQVLYHVocial cost-
benefit framework, the next section examines the impact of rail privatisation on the 
producers. 
Impact of privatisation for producers 
5DLO¶VFRVWVWUXFWXUHXQGHUSULYDWLVDWLRQ 
 The Major Government expected rail privatisation to produce welfare gains for producers in 
the form of µimproved HIILFLHQF\¶which would supposedly result from the franchised TOCs 
having greater opportunities to UHGXFH µZDVWH DQG RWKHUZLVH UHGXFH FRVWV¶.156 In practice, 
SULYDWLVDWLRQOHGWRDYHU\VLJQLILFDQWLQFUHDVHLQ WKHLQGXVWU\¶VFRVWVWUXFWXUHLQWKHIRrm of 
interface costs, cash leakages157 and transaction costs. Interface costs arose from the many 
profit-seeking companies involved in a supply chain, with each putting upward pressure on 
prices as they attempted to extract a profit from their contribution to the railway. Substantial 
cash leakages were introduced in the form of interest payments and dividends required to 
finance debt and equity, respectively. Transaction costs involve additional costs, such as 
franchise bidding costs.158  
  The principal interface costs arising from rail privatisation were track access charges 
and leasing charges for trains, which represented the majority of the 72&V¶ FRVWV. Track 
access charges were crucial to UDLO¶V finances, determining PRVWRI5DLOWUDFN¶V UHYHQXHDQG
influencing the 72&V¶subsidies which were intended to decline progressively to encourage 
operators to achieve efficiency savings. In 1999/2000, for example, the TOCs received £1.4 
billion in subsidy, which underpinned their payment of £2.2 billion in access charges, charges 
which represented 85% of 5DLOWUDFN¶V revenue. The impact of interface costs may be 
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LOOXVWUDWHGE\FRPSDULQJ%5¶VSUH-privatisation costs with those of the privatised TOCs. In 
WKHODVW\HDUEHIRUH%5¶VUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDVDQLQIUDVWUXFWure provider, its total costs 
were £3.6 billion, which divided roughly equally into £1.8 billion for infrastructure costs and 
train operations. In 1997/98, the first full operating year for the privatised rail industry, the 
72&V¶WRWDOFRVWVIRUSDVVHQJHUoperations amounted to £4.8 billion. Thus, privatisation did 
not bring expected benefits but brought an initial £3 billion increase in costs.159 While a small 
part of the rise in costs reflected increased passenger numbers, the most important cause was 
the interface costs introduced by privatisation, notably track access and leasing charges. 
  The second significant change in railway finances was the increase in cash leakages, 
in the form of funds diverted from the rail system to banks and shareholders.  %5¶V pre-
privatisation public sector borrowing was £2.5 billion in 1993/94, and its interest payments to 
government in that year totalled £121 million. Privatisation, by introducing private sector 
debt and equity, led to a large increase in cash leakages. Indeed, a very significant proportion 
of the earnings of the subsidy-dependent rail companies continues to leak from the system. 
Between 1995/96 and 2002/03, for example, the dividend and interest payments of the rail 
companies totalled £5.5 billion160, while TOCs have paid a total of £1.5 billion in dividends 
since privatisation.161 5DLOWUDFN¶VGLYLGHQGDQGLQWHUHVWSD\PHQWVEHIRUHLWVFROODSVHWRWDOOHG
£1.7 billion162DQG1HWZRUN5DLO¶VLQWHUHVWSD\PHQWVup to 2014/15 totalled £12.2 billion.163 
  Transaction costs also DGGHGVXEVWDQWLDOO\ WR UDLO¶VFRVWVWUXFWXUH Franchise bidding 
costs alone are estimated at between £3 million to £5 million per company, along with 
management costs of £2.5 million incurred by the Department for Transport for each 
franchise award. Hence, the combined cost of one franchise award with three bidders lies 
between £11.5 million and £17.5 million.164 
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  The impact of privatisation on costs was predicted both within and outside 
government. The Transport Select Committee, chaired by Conservative MP Robert Adley, 
produced a very critical report on the privatisation proposals which raised serious concerns 
over cost and safety.165  
The cost structure of the TOCs 
Competitive bidding for franchises was intended to reduce both costs and subsidy and so 
produce welfare gains for producers and government respectively. Of the original 25 
franchises, 18 were awarded to bus operators, which had not anticipated the rail passenger 
growth following privatisation. The majority of franchises were awarded for just over seven 
years, with only two granted for 10 years and five for 15 years.166 The initial franchise 
allocation is shown in Table 3. 
    TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE 
The TOCs employed former BR employees and, often, especially in the case of the three 
successful management buy-outs (MBOs), former managers. The three successful MBO 
groups soon merged with larger companies (Great Western with FirstBus, Chiltern with John 
Laing plc and Thames with Go-Ahead).167  Faced with largely fixed costs in the form of track 
access charges and train leasing charges, the original franchise bids assumed that labour costs 
and total operating costs could be reduced. However, tKHUHZDVOLWWOHµZDVWH¶IRU72&VWRFXW
out as labour costs, representing 6 RI %5¶V costs, had fallen significantly before 
privatisation. There was a 30% reduction in the number of employees in the 1980s, followed 
by an additional fall of 12% in the early 1990s.168 Hence, labour productivity improved and 
µUHPDLQHGVWURQJLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKRWKHU(XURSHDQUDLOZD\V¶.169 Further, %5¶VVXEVLG\ZDV
only 0.16% of national income compared to the European average of 0.52%.170 The idea that 
32 
 
%5¶V FRVWV µcould be reduced substantially¶ E\ IUDQFKLVing proved µillusory¶, owing to the 
efficiency gains made by BR in the 10 years prior to privatisation,  the optimism of initial 
bidders, and the cost pressures. 171  
 7HOVHU¶V FULWLTXH RI IUDQFKLVLQJ KLJKOLJKWHG a fundamental problem in awarding 
franchises to the lowest cost bidders; the neglect of µGHPDQG FRQGLWLRQV¶.172 Despite their 
inclination to save on employee costs, the TOCs soon had to recruit staff in order to meet 
increased passenger demand. Total labour costs increased by nearly 40% over the period 
1998/99 to 2002/03 as the number of employees rose by over 5,000 to 45,000.173 This 
corresponded to 44% more employees than had been budgeted for in the original franchise 
bids.174 In the longer term, the TOCs adjusted to the increased passenger demand. The total 
number of staff employed by TOCs increased by 28% between 1997/98 and 2012/13, rising 
from 39,721 to 50,782, but productivity improved as the number of passenger journeys made 
per employee increased by 39%. 175   
  A further argument for privatisation was focussed on the government, which would 
gain from better value for money and risk transfer to the private sector. Accordingly, 
adopting a broad social cost-±benefit framework, the following section examines the impact 
of rail privatisation on the government. 
Impact of privatisation for government 
Value for money  
Government was intended to benefit from the value-for-money approach which franchising 
was meant to encourage. The scope for welfare gains by government was predicated on the 
transfer of risk from the public to the private sector. A franchisee in breach of contract by, for 
example, running operating losses significantly larger than forecast faced penalties, including 
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the loss of the franchise. In practice, franchising brought very little risk transfer as 
governmentVFDQQRW µDIIRUG WR OHWSDUWRI WKH UDLOZD\V\VWHPFROODSVH¶.176  Without subsidy 
the TOCs would have made total losses of over £1 billion every year from 1997/98 to 
2002/03. The initial £2 billion subsidy to train operators was intended to decline steadily and 
then be eliminated by 2005/06 when net payments to government would be made. Cost 
escalation meant WKDW WKH RSHUDWRUV¶ VXEVLG\ FRQWLQXHG EH\RQG 5/06 and that the 
infrastructure provider has been more heavily subsidised than the TOCs. This is shown in 
Table 4. 
    TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 reveals that the TOCs received over £1 billion per year in subsidy from 2001/02 to 
2007/08. Recently, because of passenger revenue growth, the subsidy net of premium 
payments from profitable train operators fell to £83 million in 2011/12 and then finally 
became negative in 2012/13. This figure masks significant variations in the TOCs¶ financial 
performance, with 10 out of 19 operators still receiving subsidies in 2012/13 and 2013/14.177  
Further, the infrastructure provider, which was meant to be funded by track access charges, 
received extensive subsidies in the form of capital expenditure grants. In stark contrast to 
%5¶V DYHUDJH DQQXDO VXEVLG\ RI  PLOOLRQ LQ WKH GHFDGH EHIRUH SULYDWLVDWLRQ WKH WRWDO
annual rail subsidy averaged £3.5 billion between 2001/02 and 2014/15, peaking at over £5 
billion in 2006/07 and 2007/08. As network use increased, track access charges were 
intended to rise to finance additional infrastructure expenditure. This, however, would have 
necessitated even higher subsidies for the TOCs if they were to avoid operating losses.  
 The operating profits of the TOCs have varied between 3-5% of turnover since 
1997/98, ZKLFK LV RQO\ VOLJKWO\KLJKHU WKDQ µWKHDFKLHYHG by BR passenger services in 
¶ GHVSLWH PXFK KLJKHU UHYHQXHV DQG VXEVLGLHV.178 Hence, to protect train operators 
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track access charges were reduced from over £2 billion to around £1.5 billion in the years 
after 2008/09 and Network Rail became heavily dependent on government grants and private 
borrowing. The ORR highlighted how significant this wasHPSKDVLVLQJWKDWµWKHIDOOLQGLUHFW
VXEVLG\SDLGWR72&V«GRHVQRWFDSWXUHWKHLPSOLFLWJRYHUQPHQWVXEVLG\WKH\UHFHLYHYLD
WKH QHWZRUN JUDQW¶V HIIHFW RQ DFFHVV FKDUJHV¶.179 The impact of the increase in costs and 
subsidy on the rail industry was evaluated by the social cost-benefit study of Preston and 
Robins, whose results are summarised in Table 1. The study found that within the rail 
industry the TOCs gained from £2 billion in profits over the period analysed.180 Hence, the 
ATOC is able to claim commercial results for the train operators by presenting them as 
µGLVFUHWHHQWLWLHV¶181 This is a partial view of the overall impact of privatisation, involving the 
µVWRU\WHOOLQJDQGIRONORUHRIEXVLQHVVPRGHOV¶182 since the social cost-benefit study found that 
there had been a loss made by other rail producers and government of £39 billion183.  
   The overall welfare loss of £25 billion identified by Preston and Robins184 is 
supported by continuing evidence of an underlying rail industry deficit which is disguised by 
DFRPELQDWLRQRIVXEVLG\DQG1HWZRUN5DLO¶VDQQXDOLQFUHDVHVLQERUURZLQJ. This is shown in 
Table 5, which summarises the income and expenditure of the rail industry as a whole. 
    TABLE  FIVE  ABOUT HERE 
As Table 5 demonstrates, there was a rail industry deficit of over £6 billion in 2012/13. This 
was financed by a combination of government funding of £3.8 billion and an increase in 
private borrowing of £3 billion. 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V Gebt reached £35 billion in 2014/15, 
requiring interest payments of over £1 billion for the year, and is projected to rise to a 
staggering £50 billion by 2019.185   
Regulation of franchises 
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 As with all privatisations of industries in the public sector, a key political objective of 
rail privatisation was to produce a welfare gain for government by reducing the need for 
political intervention in the industry. It was recognised that regulation of franchises was 
needed to protect consumers, but this role was allocated to regulatory bodies - OPRAF and 
then the SRA. A key problem faced by these bodies was that there is always the risk of the 
µLQDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPRIWKHORZHVWELGGHUV¶UHVXOWLQJLQPDQ\H[DPSOHVRIUHQHJRWLDWLRQ186 In 
the first franchising round to 2004, the SRA absorbed risk by renegotiating more generous 
subsidies to financially weaker franchises. Over half of the original 25 franchises had 
contracts renegotiated, and by 2003 management contracts, where the SRA absorbed most of 
the risk by financing operators on a cost-plus basis, were in force on nine of the franchises.187 
Even though subsidies were intended to decline annually, the SRA increased the total subsidy 
to the TOCs by £1 billion between 2001/02 and 2003/04. 7KH65$¶VDFWLRQVLQEDLOLQJRXW
franchises were subject to much criticism. In the case of Virgin, the subsidy to the apparently 
µSURILWDEOH¶:HVW&RDVWDQG the loss-making Cross Country franchises totalled £965 million 
in the two years to March 2004, compared with the planned figure of £37.6 million for that 
period, and combined net pre-WD[ µSURILWV¶ RI WKH WZo franchises for the two years of £87 
million.188 7KHRULJLQVRIWKLVµGHEDFOH¶OD\SDUWO\LQ9LUJLQ¶VRYHU-optimistic franchise bids, 
EXWDOVRLQ5DLOWUDFN¶VSRRUPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH:HVW&RDVW0DLQ/LQHXSJUDGHDQGWKHODWH
delivery of the new Pendolino trains. 189  Higher than expected subsidies were a feature of 
most franchises in 2002/03 and 2003/04, resulting from a mixture of factors: incompetent 
management by the SRA, over-optimistic franchise bidding and poor cost control by TOCs, 




 The SRA PRYHG µIURPbeing regarded by government as the answer to the railway 
problem to being seen as part of the probOHP¶ 191 The Labour Government, led by Tony 
Blair, was concerned about UDLO¶Vescalating costs and instituted a review of rail privatisation. 
The review¶V trenchant findings were presented in the 2004 rail White Paper which argued 
that rail privatisation haG FUHDWHG D µG\VIXQFWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶ DQG µD IDLOXUH WR FRQWURO
FRVWV¶.192 Fundamental structural reform was rejected because %ODLU¶V µWKLUG ZD\¶ DSSURDFK
accepted the rail privatisation model. The key organisational change proposed was the 
abolition of the short-lived SRA. Thus, tKH 'HSDUWPHQW IRU 7UDQVSRUW DFTXLUHG WKH 65$¶V
responsibilities in 2005, and so government paradoxically gained far greater powers of 
intervention in the rail industry than it had when BR existed.  
 The Blair Government did not increase its power to intervene in all franchises, 
however, as it began to devolve powers in some areas. In 2002, the Transport Secretary 
agreed that, as it was largely isolated from the rest of the network, control over the Merseyrail 
franchise could be devolved to the local Passenger Transport Executive (PTE). In 2003, the 
PTE agreed a 25 year franchise with Serco, the longest to date. Under the privatisation 
legislation responsibility for letting the ScotRail franchise was devolved, but the 2005 
Railways Act significantly increased the powers devolved to the Scottish Government over 
both passenger and freight services.193 In 2007, Transport for London was permitted to award 
a new franchise for London Overground. More recently, it was agreed that the Welsh 
Government would take over responsibility for the Wales franchise in 2018.194 
       Using its powers acquired from the SRA, the Department for Transport aimed to 
improve the 72&V¶ performance and secure better value for money by tightening up 
franchise contracts in the second franchising round. The SRA had awarded eight new 
franchises up to December 2004. The Department for Transport reduced the total number of 
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franchises from 25 to 19, and in 2006/07 eight new franchise agreements were concluded. 
The final franchise allocation at the completion of round two, in 2008, is shown in Table 6. 
    TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE 
As Table 6 reveals, there were changes in the franchise allocation compared to the first 
franchising round. However, bus operators still dominated the franchise map, controlling 15 
out of 19 franchises, with Stagecoach also part-controlling the West Coast franchise with 
Virgin. The majority of the franchises were awarded for between eight and 10 years, but a 
few longer franchises were also agreed: Chiltern for 19 years, and Wales for 15 years. 
National Express and Virgin continued with their 15-year franchises from 1996/97 for, 
respectively, c2c and the West Coast. 
 The National Audit Office (NAO) argued that the eight new franchises could 
improve value for money since the IUDQFKLVHV¶£811 million subsidy in 2006/07 was intended 
to become a payment to government of £326 million by 2011/12.195 It also emphasised that 
1HWZRUN5DLO¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUHJUDQWPHDQWWKDWWKHUHZRXOGVWLOOEHDQLQGLUHFWVXEVLG\WRWhese 
franchises of over £900 million in 2011/12. 196 The NAO also expressed further reservations, 
noting that subsidy reduction depended on passenger growth, and warned that passengers 
would pay for this both through higher fares and increased crowding.197 In 2004, the 
government had abandoned the previous price control formula and replaced it by a policy of 
increasing regulated fares annually by at least 1% above inflation, in order to enhance the 
SDVVHQJHUV¶ contribution WR UDLO¶V ULVLQJ FRVWV This policy was strongly criticised by the 
government-appointed watchdog, Passengerfocus. Based on a study of Britain and seven 
other large European economies, the watchdog found that the price of commuting to the 




in Europe.198 Its 2013 survey found that only 42% of all passengers sampled regarded ticket 
prices as value for money, a figure which plummeted to 29% for commuters.199 This was 
unsurprising when the average price of all tickets increased by 42.5% between January 2004 
and January 2011, a period when inflation was 25%.200   
  Despite attempts to improve performance through tighter franchise contracts, 
problems with TOCs have persisted. Successive governments H[SHFWHGIUDQFKLVHHVWRµLQYHVW
WDNH ULVNV DQG LQQRYDWH¶ WR LPSURYH SDVVHQJHU VHUYLFHV EXW SURGXFHG D µPXGGOH¶ E\
prioritising µSULFH¶ above other all objectives.201 In order to reduce subsidy, refranchising 
prioritises the extraction of large premium payments from profitable franchises. The East 
Coast debacle exemplified the dangers of this policy. In 2005, the East Coast franchise was 
awarded to GNER which, anticipating high passenger growth, agreed to pay a £1.3 billion 
premium over 10 years. An informed rail commentator argued that GNER: 
tried (and largely succeeded) to establish a brand name synonymous with great ideas, 
sharply focused senior managers, a determination to set high standards, and staff 
EHILWWLQJ RQH RI (XURSH¶V PRVW HVWDEOLVKHG KLJK VSHHG VHUYLFHV ZLQQLQJ LQGXVWU\
DZDUGVDQGDFFRODGHV«202 
'HVSLWHVXFKSODXGLWV*1(5¶V forecast growth failed to materialise and the train operator 
abandoned the contract. The replacement operator, National Express, contracted in 2007 to 
pay a higher premium of £1.4 billion over seven years. In 2009, the operator was faced with 
negligible revenue growth and had to renegotiate terms on its £1.2 billion debt.203 Like its 
predecessor, the company handed back the contract. The government then established 
Directly Operating Railways (DOR) to manage the franchise under short-term public 
ownership. Despite infrastructure problems, there were improved levels of customer 
satisfaction and punctuality and the State-owned operator was financially successful. In 




  The Coalition Government formed in 2010 was also anxious to deliver savings 
through refranchising. It accepted the recommendations of the McNulty rail review, 
established by the Labour Government in 2009, that costs were too high and that franchises 
should become less prescriptive and longer in order to encourage, respectively, TOCs to flex 
outputs and to invest more.205 The first attempt to implement this policy occurred in the third 
franchising round in 2012/13, which began with the provisional award of the new West Coast 
franchise. After a competition involving four bidders, the 13-year franchise was awarded to 
FirstGroup, which offered higher premium payments than the incumbent operator Virgin Rail 
Group. After Virgin sought a judicial review, the Department for Transport discovered 
serious errors in the procurement process. As a result, the new award was cancelled, 9LUJLQ¶V
existing franchise was extended and outstanding franchise competitions suspended. The 
government established a review of franchising, which represented the third major 
investigation of rail in under a decade, chaired by Eurostar InternaWLRQDO¶V&KDLUPDQ5LFKDUG
Brown. The cancellation was also subject to critical scrutiny by the NAO and by the Select 
Committees on Transport and Public Accounts. The Public Accounts Committee criticised 
WKH'HSDUWPHQWIRU7UDQVSRUWIRUQRWXVLQJµFRPPRQVHQVH¶WRTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU)LUVW*URXS¶V
SDVVHQJHUJURZWKIRUHFDVWZDVµWRRJRRGWREHWUXH¶GHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWLWVIRUHFDVWRI
DQQXDOJURZWKZDVKLJKHUWKDQ9LUJLQ¶VIRUHFDVWRIDQGthe prediction of 7% by the two 
losing bids.206  
   The implications for the franchising programme of the cancellation of the West 
Coast competition were examined by the 2012 Brown review which, like the two previous 
rail reviews, rejected µPDMRUVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJH¶LGHQWLI\LQJSDVVHQJHUJURZWKDVHYLGHQFHWKDW
franchLVLQJ ZDV QRW µIXQGDPHQWDOO\ IODZHG¶.207 This was consonant with the views of 
successive governments and the McNulty report which argued that substantial cost savings 
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are achievable without structural change. Instead, the Brown review proposed franchising 
reforms, including simplifying the bidding process and reducing the length and increasing the 
flexibility of franchise agreements.208 While there are examples of relatively successful 
longer franchises, such as Chiltern which pays premia to the government,  the Brown review 
highlighted a fundamental problem with franchise bidding: WKHµXQFHUWDLQWLHVRIIRUHFDVWLQJ¶
particularly of revenue.209 %URZQ¶VSURSRVHGVROXWLRQRIVKRUWHUIUDQFKLVHVRIEHWZHHQVHYHQ
and 10 years reversed the Coalition GRYHUQPHQW¶V DWWHPSW to encourage investment by 
offering longer franchises. The interventionist responses of successive governments to 
FRQWLQXLQJ IUDQFKLVLQJ SUREOHPV KDYH EHHQ DSWO\ VXPPDULVHG DV µERGJLQJ WHPSRUDU\
VROXWLRQV¶210 
 In March 2013 the Department for Transport launched a revised franchising 
programme of over an eight-year period. Following a recommendation of the Brown review, 
that franchise competitions should be staggered with a limited number of annual 
competitions, the Department for Transport has awarded five franchises through competitions 
but has made 11 direct awards without competition to incumbent operators.211 The franchise 
allocation in 2015/16 is shown in Table 7. 
    TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE 
As Table 7 reveals, the striking change in the franchise map compared to the two previous 
franchising rounds is the replacement of the dominance of bus operators by that of overseas 
operators. Of the 18 franchises, 12 were placed under the sole or joint control of overseas 
operators. These operators are dominated by subsidiaries of three overseas State-owned rail 
companies, those of France, Germany and the Netherlands. The majority of franchises, which 
include the direct awards, will last for between two and eight years, while c2c has a new 15-




GZLQGOLQJ¶ KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH IDFW WKDW RQO\ WKUHH ELGV ZHUH UHFHLYHG IRU HDFK RI WKH ILYH
franchise competitions run since 2013, compared to an average of four bids for the previous 
10 competitions.212 )XUWKHUWKH&RPPLWWHHDUJXHGWKDWWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI7UDQVSRUWµKDVQRW
yet developed the partnerships with operators that are required to support innovation, 
LPSURYHHIILFLHQF\DQG LPSURYHVHUYLFHV IRUSDVVHQJHUV¶KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKDWDQ\UHGXFWLRQ WR




 This paper has adopted the broad framework of social cost-benefit studies to evaluate the 
impact of rail privatisation on the welfare of three key groups in society: consumers, 
producers and the government. The claims for rail franchising were tested in this study by 
examining how the performance of the privatised industry impacted on these three groups, 
and so analysing the extent to which the main objectives of the 1992 rail White Paper have 
been achieved. As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, the main success claimed for 
franchising is that it benefited consumers in terms of fares and quality of service and so led to 
a growth in passenger demand. Both the social cost-benefit studies of rail privatisation 
identify welfare gains for consumers. Although passenger growth was aided by price capping 
in the early years, and by some innovations and investment introduced by franchisees, the 
underlying cause ZDV%ULWDLQ¶Vsustained period of economic growth.  
  The quality of service delivered by the privatised rail industry declined significantly 
in the early years, as evidenced by the limited rolling stock investment, the fall in punctuality 
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and increase in overcrowding, and the neglect of safety considerations which led to fatal 
accidents. More recently, the improvements in punctuality and safety have largely stemmed 
from the infrastructure investment by Network Rail, underpinned by capital grants and 
increased borrowing.  
  Alongside consumers, producers were also meant to accrue welfare gains from 
privatisation in terms of the opportunities to improve efficiency and reduce costs. While 
IUDQFKLVLQJ PD\ EH UHJDUGHG DV D µPRGHUDWH VXFFHVV¶ RQ WKH GHPDQG VLGH LW KDV µIDLOHG WR
DFKLHYHLWVREMHFWLYHVRQWKHFRVWVLGH¶.214 Franchising has not delivered the efficiency savings 
as anticipated, and total rail costs have more than doubled since privatisation while total 
subsidies have tripled when they were expected to disappear by 2005/06. 215 The increase in 
costs and subsidy means that both the industry and government have lost from privatisation, a 
net welfare loss estimated at £37 billion by Preston and Robins.216 There has been a gain by 
TOCs of £2 billion in profits217, but train operators only appear profitable because accounting 
is used as a calculative technology to portray WKH72&VDV µGLVFUHWH HQWLWLHV¶ in a narrative 
which ignores the reduction in their track access charges and the indirect subsidy they receive 
IURP1HWZRUN5DLO¶VFDSLWDOJUDQWV 
  As well as losing from privatisation because of the increased subsidies required, 
governments have not experienced any welfare gains from the expected reduction in political 
intervention in the rail industry. The Department for Transport now awards and regulates the 
majority of franchises and determines subsidy levels. Successive governments have made 
repeated attemptVWRUHIRUPWKHIODZHGIUDQFKLVLQJEXVLQHVVEXWLWUHPDLQVµG\VIXQFWLRQDODQG
H[SHQVLYH¶DQGµLQLQWHQVLYHFDUHIROORZLQJWKH:HVW&RDVWGHEDFOHRI¶218 The ultimate 
paradox is that, by 2015/16, the majority of franchises were controlled by subsidiaries of 
overseas State-owned railways. However, the Coalition Government would not allow DOR, 
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despite its success in running the East Coast TOC under public ownership, to enter the  
competition when the line was re-franchised. 
  The railway industry began in a disaggregated manner with franchising in the 1820s 
and 1830s, but developed, initially through mergers and ultimately nationalisation, into a 
vertically integrated network. From the interwar years onwards, the railway industry faced 
increased competition from road transport and displayed fundamental financial problems. As 
a highly capital intensive industry, it is difficult to cover full running costs from fares. This 
dilemma has been critical for the rail industry under both private and public ownership. BR 
came closest to resolving the dilemma before its privatisation by undertaking major 
organisational reforms which led to very significant improvements in both productivity and 
punctuality. Privatisation fragmented the integrated network which had been operated by BR. 
Although social cost-benefit studies identify welfare gains for consumers, the industry and 
government are losers as privatisation has increased both costs and subsidy. Further, the rail 
franchising business sector which has resulted two decades after privatisation is a very 
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Table 1 Summary of estimated welfare gains and losses in social cost-benefit studies of rail 
privatisation 
             
 
1. Pollitt and Smith 
 
Years included: 1996/97 to 1999/2000    Discount rate   6% 
 
  £billion 
Consumers gain     1.2 
Producers gain  0.2 
Government loses  (300) 
Total welfare gain  1.1 
             
 
2. Preston and Robins 
 
Years included: 1995/96 to 2008/09    Discount rate  3.5% 
 
  £billion 
Consumers gain     12 
TOCs gain    2 
Other producers and government lose  (39) 
Total welfare loss  (25) 
 
             
Sources: Preston and Robins, Evaluating the long term impacts of transport policy, 2013,     







Table 2. Public performance measure by sector: percentage of trains arriving on time              
   1997/98 to 2015/16 
               
 
Year  Long distance  London and SE Regional All franchised 
  operators  operators  operators operators 
  %   %   %  % 
 
1997/98 81.7   89.5   90.8  89.8 
1998/99 80.6   87.9   88.6  87.9 
1999/00 83.7   87.1   89.1  87.8 
2000/01 69.1   77.6   81.7  79.1 
2001/02 70.2   77.8   79.1  78.0 
2002/03 70.6   78.9   80.5  79,2 
2003/04 73.4   80.3   82.9  81.2 
2004/05 79.2   84.7   82.6  83.6 
2005/06 82.2   87.9   85.0  86.4 
2006/07 84.9   88.8   87.6  88.1 
2007/08 86.2   90.6   89.6  89.9 
2008/09 87.3   91.0   90.6  90.6 
2009/10 88.7   91.4   92.0  91.4 
2010/11 87.8   91.0   91.1  90.8 
2011/12 89.1   91.7   92.0  91.6 
2012/13 87.1   91.0   91.6  90.9 
2013/14 86.9   89.6   91.1  90.0 
2014/15 87.4   89.0   91.3  89.7 
2015/16 87.6   87.8   91.2  89.1 
             
 
 
1RWH$UULYLQJµRQWLPH¶LVPHDVXUHGDVDUUiving within 5 min of the published timetable for  
          London and the South East (SE) and regional operators and arriving within 10 min of                           
          the published timetable for the long distance operators.  
 






Table 3 Allocation of  the original 25 TOC franchises in 1996/97 
             
Franchisee       Franchises allocated 
 
National Express Group (B)     Gatwick Express 
         Midland Mainline 
        North London 
        Central 
                   ScotRail 
 
Prism Rail (B)       Cardiff 
        South Wales & West,  
        London, Tilbury and Southend 
        West Anglia Great Northern 
 
Stagecoach Holdings (B)     South West 
        Island Line 
 
Connex Rail       South Central 
        South Eastern 
 
Great Western Holdings (MBO/First Bus) (B)  Great Western  
        North West    
 
Merseyside Transport Ltd Trust Holdings (B)  Merseyrail Electrics 
        North East 
 
Virgin Trains       Cross Country 
       West Coast 
        
M40 Trains (MBO/J. Laing plc)    Chiltern Railways  
 
First Bus (B)       Great Eastern 
 
Great North Eastern Railway (Sea Containers)  East Coast 
 
Victory Railway Holdings (MBO/Go-Ahead ) (B)  Thames Trains 
 
GB Railways       Anglia Railways 
 
Govia (Go-Ahead/VIA GTI) (B)    Thameslink 
             
 
Notes: B= Bus operators in sole control or  joint venture. MBO = Management buy-out. 






Table 4. Government support for TOCs and Railtrack/Network Rail from 2001/02  
               to 2014/15 
                
  Subsidies   Capital expenditure grants   Total 
  to TOCs  to Railtrack/Network Rail  support 
      £m     £m       £m 
             
   
Year 
2001/02 1,037       499    1,536 
2002/03 1,239       792    2,031 
2003/04 1,773    1,448    3,221 
2004/05 1,267    2,058    3,325 
2005/06 1,211    1,985    3,196 
2006/07 1,769    3,397    5,166 
2007/08 1,433    3,673    5,106 
2008/09    554    4,266    4,820 
2009/10    755    3,564    4,319 
2010/11    249    3,492    3,741 
2011/12      83    3,745    3,828 
2012/13 (256)    3,780    3,524 
2013/14   142    3,453    3,595 
2014/15 (679)    3,802    3,123 
             
Totals  10,577             39,954                      50,531   
 
Note:  The 2012/13 and 2014/15 subsidy figures show overall net payments by TOCs to 
 government. 
Source: ORR Government support to the rail industry, 2015d, Table 1.6.  Nominal values, 











Table 5. Rail industry income and expenditure in 2012/13 
             
    £bn    £bn   £bn 
Income  
Passenger fare income 7.7 
Other income   1.3 
 
Total income       9.0 
 
Expenditure    
Network Rail 
Operating costs  2.7 
Financing costs  1.5 
Capital expenditure  4.8 
Total        9.0 
 
TOCs 
Staff costs   2.3 
Rolling stock costs  1.5 
Other costs   2.5   
Total        6.3 
Total expenditure of  Network Rail + TOCS            15.3 
Rail industry deficit (income ± expenditure)               (6.3) 
Deficit covered by: 
Government subsidy to TOCs + Network Rail grant     3.8 
Increase in Network Rail borrowing       3.0 
           6.8 
 
             
Note: Income and expenditure figures exclude track access charges paid by TOCs to  
 Network Rail. 
Sources: Network Rail Annual Report and Accounts 2013. ORR GB rail industry financial 





Table 6 Allocation of 19 TOC franchises in June 2008 
             
Franchisee       Franchises allocated 
 
FirstGroup (B)      Greater Western 
        Thameslink/Great Northern 
        ScotRail 
(FirstGroup/Keolis)      Transpenine Express 
 
 
National Express Group (B)     c2c (London, Tilbury and  
        Southend) 
        Greater Anglia 
        InterCity East Coast 
 
Govia (B)        Integrated Kent   
        South Central (including Gatwick 
        Express) 
        West Midlands   
                 
 
Arriva (B)       New Cross Country 
        Wales 
         
     
Stagecoach Group (B)     East Midlands   
        South Western 
 
Serco (Serco/NED Rail)     Northern 
        Merseyrail  
 
Virgin Group (Virgin/Stagecoach)    West Coast 
        
Deutsche Bahn      Chiltern 
MTR/Deutsche Bahn      London Overground  
     
             
 
Notes: Keolis is a joint venture of the French State-owned railway SNCF (70%) and the 
 Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund (30%) . Deutsche Bahn is the German State 
 railway. 075UXQV+RQJ.RQJ¶VUDLOZD\ 
 B = bus operators in control. The Table is dated June 2008 as this was when the 
 Gatwick Express became part of the South Central franchise. 
Source: Adapted from NAO Department for Transport: Letting rail franchises 2005-2007,             
   2008, p.5. 
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Table 7 Allocation of 18 TOC franchises in 2015/16 
             
Franchisee       Franchises allocated 
 
Govia (Go-Ahead/Keolis) (O)    London Midland   
        South Eastern 
        Govia Thameslink (includes  
        Southern)    
                
 
Arriva (Deutsche Bahn) (O)     Cross Country 
        Chiltern 
        Wales 
         
Abellio (Nederlandse Spoorwegen) (O)   Greater Anglia 
        Scotrail 
(Abellio/Serco)      Northern    
      
 
Stagecoach        East Midland Trains  
        South West Trains 
(Stagecoach/Virgin)      Virgin East Coast   
         
 
First Group       First Great Western 
(First Group/Keolis) (O)     First Transpenine Express 
         
 
National Express      c2c (London, Tilbury and  
        Southend) 
 
Serco (Serco/Abellio) (O)     Merseyrail  
 
Virgin Trains       Virgin West Coast 
        
MTR/Deutsche Bahn (O)     London Overground  
     
             
Notes: Keolis is a joint venture of the French State-owned railway SNCF (70%) and the 
 Quebec Deposit and Investment Fund (30%) . Arriva is a subsidiary of the German 
 State railway and Abellio is a subsidiary of the Dutch State railway. MTR runs Hong 
 .RQJ¶VUDLOZD\. O = overseas operator in sole or joint control. 
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